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Incomplete asset markets cause competitive equilibria to be constrained sub-
optimal and provides scope for Pareto improving interventions. In this paper,
we examines how intervention in prices in asset or spot commodity markets
serve this purpose. We show that, if ﬁx-price equilibria behave suﬃciently regu-
larly near Walrasian equilibria, Pareto improving price regulation is generically
possible. An advantage of price regulation, contrasted with interventions in in-
dividuals’ asset portfolios, is that it operates anonymously, on market variables.
Key words: incomplete asset market, ﬁx-price equilibria, Pareto improve-
ment.
JEL classiﬁcation numbers: D45, D52, D60.1 Introduction
When asset markets are incomplete, competitive equilibrium allocations gener-
ically fail to satisfy the criterion of constrained Pareto optimality which recog-
nizes the incompleteness of the asset market. Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis
(1986) showed that, generically, there exist reallocations of portfolios that yield
Pareto improvements in welfare after prices in spot commodity markets adjust
to attain equilibrium; Citanna, Kajii and Villanacci (1998) developed further
and generalized the argument.
The failure of constrained optimality casts doubt on non-intervention with
competitive markets.
Expansions of the asset market do not necessarily lead to Pareto improve-
ments: Hart (1975) gave an example of ﬁnancial innovation that leads to a
Pareto deterioration; Cass and Citanna (1998), Elul (1995) and Hara (1997)
identiﬁed conditions for Pareto improving ﬁnancial innovation.
The taxation of trades in assets, which is anonymous, can generically imple-
ment a Pareto improvement. Citanna, Polemarchakis and Tirelli (2001) demon-
strated the result, which requires that the number of individuals not exceed the
number of traded assets; it provides only a partial answer to Kajii (1994), who
pointed out that, apart from informational requirements, the heterogeneity of
individuals and the requirement of anonymity may interfere with improving
interventions.
The direct regulation of prices in spot commodity markets is an alternative
to the reallocation of portfolios or the taxation of trades in assets. Importantly,
this is not an intervention in individual choice variables but in market variables,
and, as such, it satisﬁes the requirement of anonymity.
An extension of the ﬁx-price equilibrium of Dr` eze (1975) provides a notion
of equilibrium that allows for trading at non-competitive prices; alternative
speciﬁcations, in Barro and Grossman (1971), B´ enassy (1975) or Youn` es (1975)
should not aﬀect the argument.
The results of Laroque (1978, 1981), nevertheless, point out a stumbling
block: the behavior of ﬁx-price equilibria in the neighborhood of competitive
equilibria is particularly complicated. There are robust examples for which, at
regulated prices close to competitive prices, there are no ﬁx-price equilibria close
to competitive equilibria. Here, we restrict attention to the class of economies,
evidently restrictive, that satisfy conditions suﬃcient for the local uniqueness
of ﬁx-price equilibria. In Herings and Polemarchakis (2003), a robust example
illustrates the approach as well as the results.
The conditions under which the result holds, that the number of instruments
(contingent commodities) exceed the number of objectives (individuals), imply
that the result complements the one of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986)
and Citanna, Polemarchakis and Tirelli (2001).
Antecedents of this result are the argument in Polemarchakis (1979), where
ﬁxed wages that need not match shocks in productivity may yield higher ex-
pected utility in spite of the loss of output in an economy of overlapping genera-
tions; and the argument in Dr` eze and Gollier (1993), which employs the capital
1asset pricing model to determine optimal schedules of wages that diﬀer from
the marginal productivity of labor. Kalmus (1997) gave a heuristic example of
Pareto improving price regulation.
Of serious concern are the informational requirements needed to determine,
even compute, improving interventions. In the case of price regulation they
involve knowledge of marginal utilities of income and excess demands for com-
modities across states. Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1990) and K¨ ubler,
Chiappori, Ekeland and Polemarchakis (2002) are only ﬁrst steps towards an
analysis of the informational requirements of active policy.
2 The economy
The economy is that of the standard two-period general equilibrium model with
num´ eraire assets and incomplete asset markets. Assets exchange before and
commodities after the state of the world realizes.
States of the world are s ∈S= {1,...,S} and commodities are l ∈L=
{1,...,L+1}. At state s, commodity (L+1,s) is num´ eraire. Assets are a ∈A=
{1,...,A+1}. Asset A+1isnum´ eraire. The payoﬀs of assets are denominated
in the num´ eraire commodity, (L +1 ,s), at every state of the world.
A bundle of commodities at a state of the world is xs =( ...,x l,s,...,
x(L+1),s); across states of the world, x =( ...,x s,...). A portfolio of assets
is y =( ...,y a,...,y A+1).
The payoﬀs of an asset across states of the world are Ra· =( ...,R a,s,...) ;
at a state of the world, payoﬀs of assets are R·s =( ...,R a,s,...); across states
of the world, the asset payoﬀ matrix is R =( ...,R a·,...).
The asset payoﬀ matrix has full column rank, and the num´ eraire asset has
positive payoﬀs: RA+1· > 0.
Individuals are i ∈I= {1,...,I}. A utility function, ui, that satisﬁes stan-
dard conditions of continuity, monotonicity, quasi-concavity and, when required,
smoothness and boundary behavior, and the endowment, ei, a strictly positive
bundle, describe an individual — the boundary behavior of the utility function,
together with the strict positivity of the endowment guarantee that consump-
tion bundles demanded by the individual lie in the interior of the consumption
set, as in see Debreu (1972).
The utility functions and consumption sets of individuals as well as the ma-
trix of asset payoﬀs do not vary. The allocation of endowments, ω =( ...,e i,...),
identiﬁes an economy, and the set of economies coincides with the strictly posi-
tive orthant of the commodity space; a property holds generically if it holds for
an open set of economies of full Lebesgue measure.
Prices of commodities at a state of the world are (...,p l,s,...,1); across
states of the world, p =( ...,p s,...)   0; the price of the num´ eraire commodity
at a state of the world is pL+1,s = 1; the domain of prices of commodities is
P. Prices of assets are q =( ...,q a,...,1); The price of the num´ eraire asset is
qA+1 =1 . The domain of prices of assets is Q.
2It is often convenient to truncate prices of commodities and prices of assets
by deleting the prices of the num´ eraires. Commodities or assets other than the
num´ eraire are ˇ L or ˇ A; the domain of prices of commodities or assets other than
the num´ eraires is ˇ P or ˇ Q.
At arbitrary terms of trade, a competitive equilibrium, typically, does not
exist. In commodities and assets other than the num´ eraire, rationing on net
trades, uniform across individuals, serves to attain market clearing. Rationing
in the supply (demand) of commodities other than the num´ eraire is z ≤ 0
(z ≥ 0). Rationing in the supply (demand) of assets other than the num´ eraire is
y ≤ 0( y ≥ 0). Without appropriate rationing constraints, demand and supply
of commodities will not match, which leads to inconsistencies. Equilibrium
rationing constraints are exactly such that markets clear.
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his optimization problem is to choose a utility maximizing consumption bundle
and asset portfolio in his budget set. The set of all optimal consumption bundles
and asset portfolios is denoted di(p,q,z,z,y,y).
An individual is eﬀectively rationed in his supply (demand) for a commodity
or an asset if he could increase his utility when the rationing constraint in the
supply (demand) of that commodity or asset is removed. There is eﬀective
supply (demand) rationing in the market for a commodity or an asset if at least
one individual is eﬀectively rationed in his supply (demand) for this commodity
or asset. At a competitive equilibrium, there is neither eﬀective supply rationing
nor eﬀective demand rationing in the market for any commodity or asset. In
this sense, a competitive equilibrium is a special case of a ﬁx-price equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1 (Fix-price equilibrium). A ﬁx-price equilibrium at prices
(p,q) is a pair ((x∗,y∗),(z∗,z∗,y∗,y∗)), such that
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4. for every a ∈ ˇ A, if for some i  yi
 ∗
a = y∗
a, then for all i ∈Iyi∗
a < y∗
a, while
if for some i  yi
 ∗
a = y∗
a, then for all i ∈Iyi∗
a >y ∗
a.
At a ﬁx-price equilibrium, only one side of the market is eﬀectively rationed;
this is expressed by conditions 3 and 4.
3At prices (p,q), ﬁx-price equilibria exist. Appendix 1 spells out the argu-
ments in detail. Herings and Polemarchakis (2002) provide a (more complicated)
proof that requires weaker assumptions on the primitives.
A sign vector,
r =( r1,1,...,r L,S,r 1,...,r A),
describes the state of markets at a ﬁx-price equilibrium. If there is eﬀective
supply rationing in the market for a commodity or an asset, the associated
component of the sign vector is -1, if there is eﬀective demand rationing it is
+1, and if there is no eﬀective rationing it is 0.
For a sign vector r, the set PQ(r) is the set of prices (p,q) ∈P× Q , for which
there exists a ﬁx-price equilibrium at prices (p,q) with state of the markets r.
For prices (p,q) ∈P×Q , the set of ﬁx-price equilibrium allocations is D(p,q),
and, for a sign vector r, the set of ﬁx-price equilibrium allocations with state of
the markets r is D(p,q,r).
A neighborhood of α is Nα. If ((p∗,q∗),(x∗,y∗)) is a competitive equilibrium,
the allocation (x∗,y ∗) is locally unique as a ﬁx-price equilibrium allocation
if there exists a neighborhood N x∗,y∗ such that for every Nx∗,y∗ ⊂ N x∗,y∗
there exists a neighborhood Np∗,q∗ with D(p,q) ∩N x∗,y∗ a singleton for every
(p,q) ∈N p∗,q∗.
If a competitive equilibrium allocation is locally unique as a ﬁx-price equilib-
rium allocation, then, for prices close to competitive equilibrium prices, there is
exactly one ﬁx-price equilibrium allocation close to the competitive allocation.
For a locally unique competitive equilibrium allocation, for each sign vector
r, the function (  xr,   yr):N p∗,q∗ ∩P Q (r) → IR
I(L+1)S+I(A+1) associates the
unique ﬁx-price equilibrium allocation in N x∗,y∗ ∩D(p,q,r)t o( p,q).
Comparative statics require a diﬀerentiable form of local uniqueness.
Deﬁnition 2 (Diﬀerentiable local uniqueness). If ((p∗,q∗),(x∗,y∗)) is a
competitive equilibrium, the allocation (x∗,y∗) is diﬀerentiably locally unique as
a ﬁx-price equilibrium allocation if it is locally unique and there is a neighborhood
Np∗,q∗ such that, for every sign vector r, the function (  xr,   yr)|Np∗,q∗∩P Q (r) is
diﬀerentiable.
Laroque and Polemarchakis (1978) proved, for a complete asset market, that,
generically, the set of ﬁx-price equilibrium allocations can be represented by a
ﬁnite number of continuously diﬀerentiable functions of prices. Nevertheless,
the results in Laroque (1978) and the examples in Madden (1982) show that
competitive equilibria need not be locally unique as ﬁx-price equilibria. Even
though ﬁx-price equilibrium allocations exist for all prices, there may be robust
local non-existence, and therefore local non-uniqueness as a ﬁx-price equilib-
rium, at competitive prices.
Assumption 1. For endowments in Ω∗, an open set of full Lebesgue measure, if
((p∗,q∗), (x∗,y∗)) is a competitive equilibrium, then the competitive equilibrium
allocation is diﬀerentiably locally unique as a ﬁx-price equilibrium allocation.
4By an argument similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 1, Laroque (1981),
Appendix 2 characterizes economies where competitive equilibrium allocation
are diﬀerentiably locally unique as a ﬁx-price equilibrium allocation.
Local uniqueness of ﬁx-price equilibrium allocations at competitive equilibria
is not too strong a requirement; it is less demanding than the requirement of
uniqueness of ﬁx-price equilibrium allocations at prices in a neighborhood of
competitive prices. This guarantees a certain degree of generality of the results.
The function (  x,   y) associates the unique ﬁx-price equilibrium allocation in
Nx∗,y∗ to (p,q) ∈N p∗,q∗. At a locally unique ﬁx-price equilibrium,
vi(p,q)=ui(  xi(p,q)), (p,q) ∈N p∗,q∗
deﬁnes the indirect utility function of an individual. Lemma 2 in Appendix 2
implies that it is diﬀerentiable when the ﬁx-price equilibrium is diﬀerentiably
locally unique, with partial derivatives given by
∂pl,svi(p∗,q∗)=−∂xL+1,sui(xi∗)(xi∗
l,s − ei
l,s), (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S.
The eﬀect of a change in the spot market price of commodity (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S
is equal to minus the marginal utility of the num´ eraire commodity in state s
multiplied by the excess demand of commodity (l,s) at the competitive equi-
librium. Lemma 2 in Appendix 2 therefore implies that the indirect welfare
eﬀects of a change in prices, generated by the induced change in the rationing
constraints and individuals’ choices, equal zero.
Pareto improving price regulation
If the asset market is incomplete, A+1 <S ,generically, competitive equilibrium
allocations are not Pareto optimal.
Price regulation can Pareto improve on a competitive equilibrium ((p∗,
q∗),(x∗,y∗)) if there exist prices of commodities p such that a ﬁx-price equi-
librium of commodities at prices of commodities and assets (p,q∗) Pareto domi-
nates the allocation x∗. The ambiguity introduced by the possibility of multiple
ﬁx-price equilibrium allocations at prices (p,q∗) is circumvented by considering
local variations at competitive equilibrium allocations that are diﬀerentiably
locally unique as ﬁx-price equilibria.
Deﬁnition 3 (Pareto improving price regulation). Price regulation can
Pareto improve upon a competitive equilibrium, ((p∗,q∗),(x∗,y∗)), that is locally




∂pl,svi(p∗,q∗)dpl,s > 0, for every i ∈I .
Uniform price regulation can improve upon a competitive equilibrium if
dˇ ps = dˇ ps , for all s,s  ∈S .
5If (uniform) price regulation can improve upon a competitive equilibrium,
there is ε>0 such that for all ε ∈ (0,ε], the ﬁx-price equilibrium in the neigh-
borhood of the competitive equilibrium ((p∗,q∗),(x∗,y∗)) at commodity prices
ˇ p∗+εdˇ p and asset prices q∗ Pareto dominates the competitive equilibrium. Uni-
form price regulations are of interest because they imply a state-independent
change in prices. It shows that relatively simple policies suﬃce for the realization
of a Pareto improvement 1.
Generically, it is possible to make every individual better oﬀ by choosing
appropriate price regulations on the spot markets when asset markets are in-
complete. One needs at least as many instruments, LS, as individuals, I.
Uniform price regulation is eﬀective when L ≥ I, which reﬂects again that
the number of instruments has to exceed the number of objectives. This comple-
ments the constrained suboptimality result of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis
(1986), which applies when 2L ≤ I ≤ L(S − 1) + 1.
Proposition 1. Suppose that
1. For every individual, the consumption set is X i = {x : x ≥ 0}; the utility
function is continuous and quasi - concave; in the interior of the con-
sumption set 2, Int X i, it is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, ∂ui   0
and ∂2ui is negative deﬁnite on 3 (∂ui)⊥; the endowment is strictly posi-
tive: ei ∈ Int X i, and ui(ei) >u i(x), for every x ∈ Bd X i.
2. The matrix of payoﬀs of assets has full column rank. The numeraire asset,
has positive payoﬀ: rA+1 > 0.
If Assumption 1 holds, the asset market is incomplete (A+1 <S ), and LS ≥
I>1, then, generically, price regulation can improve upon any competitive
equilibrium.
If L ≥ I>1, then, generically, uniform price regulation can improve upon
any competitive equilibrium.
Appendix 3 gives the proof, which follows Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis
(1986) and Citanna, Kajii and Villanacci (1998).
In the paper we focus on the adjustment of prices of state-contingent com-
modities, rather than asset prices. One reason for this is that government
interventions in commodity prices seem to occur much more frequently than
government control of asset prices. From a purely normative point of view, the
case where the central planner is limited to adjustments of asset prices only,
with competitive spot commodity markets in future periods, is interesting as
well. It provides an anonymous alternative to the adjustment of individual
asset portfolios as proposed in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986).
A ﬁnal issue of interest is the case where asset prices adjust to clear markets
after the central planner intervened in spot commodity markets. The current
1John Geanakoplos and Hamid Sabourian insisted on this point.
2“Int” denotes the interior of a set and “Bd” the boundary.
3“⊥” denotes the orthogonal complement.
6analysis ﬁxes asset prices at q∗, which allows us to derive a simple expression
for the derivative with respect to spot commodity prices of the indirect utility
function in Lemma 2. The corresponding expression for an indirect utility func-
tion where asset prices adjust to clear the asset markets is more complicated,
and the question whether Pareto improving price regulation is possible in that
sense is open.
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8Appendix 1: existence of ﬁx-price equilibria
A compact, convex subset of the consumption set that contains the aggregate
initial endowment in its interior is   X i The assumptions on utility functions
and on the asset return matrix imply that all S + 1 budget inequalities in
the deﬁnition of the budget set hold with equality at the optimal choice of an
individual. The rationing inequalities do not necessarily hold with equality.
The budget set related to   X i with all budget inequalities required to hold with
equality is   βi and the corresponding demand function   di. Since prices are ﬁxed
at (p,q), they are omitted in the notation.
The demand functions   di,i∈I , are continuous.
If (zn,zn,y
n,yn) is a sequence that converges to (z,z,y,y), then the se-
quence (  di(zn,zn,y
n, yn)) has a convergent subsequence, with limit (  x,   y) ∈
  βi(z,z,y,y).
If there exists (  x,   y) ∈   βi(z,z,y,y), such that ui(  x) >u i(  x), and   L−,   L+,
  A−, and   A+, is the sets of non-num´ eraire commodities and non-num´ eraire assets
for which   xl,s−ei

























  ya ,a∈   A+
 
,
  xn = ei + λn(  x − ei), and   yn = λn  y, (  xn,   yn) ∈   βi(zn,zn,yn,yn). Evidently,
limn→∞ λn =1 , and limn→∞(  xn,   yn)=(   x,   y). By the continuity of ui,   xn is
strictly preferred to the consumption bundle in   di(zn,zn,y
n,yn), a contradic-
tion.
Since there is no rationing in the market of the num´ eraire asset nor in the
market of the num´ eraire commodities, the argument for equilibrium existence
is not trivial.






l,s + ε, with ε some ﬁxed positive number. Since R has full
column rank, this implies that there is α>0 such that  y∗i ∞ <αfor any y∗i
consistent with a ﬁx-price equilibrium at prices (p,q).









where CK = {r ∈ IR








l,s + ε}, (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S,






l,s + ε}, (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S,
y
a(ρ)= −min{2ρaα,α},a ∈ ˇ A,
ya(ρ) = min{(2 − 2ρa)α,α},a ∈ ˇ A.









l,s, (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S
  za(r,ρ)=
 I
i=1   di
a(z(r),z(r),y(ρ),y(ρ)),a ∈ ˇ A.
If (r∗,ρ ∗) ∈C LS ×C A is such that   z(r∗,ρ ∗)=0 , then ((x∗,y∗),(z∗,z∗,y∗,
y∗)), where (x∗i,y∗i)=  di(z∗,z∗,y∗,y∗),i∈I , (z∗,z∗)=( z(r∗),z(r∗)),(y∗,y∗)
=( y(r∗),y(r∗)), is a ﬁx-price equilibrium. Conditions 1 and 2 of Deﬁnition 1
are satisﬁed for non-numeraire commodities and assets. The construction of the
functions (z,z) and (y,y) takes care of Conditions 3 and 4.
The set   z(CLS ×C A) is compact. Let the set ZY be a compact, convex set








ρaya : r ∈C LS,ρ∈C A}.
The correspondence ϕ : ZY ×CLS ×C A →Z Y×C LS ×C A is deﬁned by
ϕ(z,y,r,ρ)={  z(r,ρ)}×µ(z,y). It is a non-empty, compact, convex valued, up-
per hemi-continuous correspondence deﬁned on a non-empty, compact, convex
set. By Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem, ϕ has a ﬁxed point, (z∗,y∗,r∗,ρ ∗).
If, for some a ∈ ˇ A,y ∗
a < 0, then, by the deﬁnition of µ, ρ∗
a =0 , so y∗
a ≥ 0, a
contradiction. If, for some a ∈ ˇ A,y ∗
a > 0, then, by the deﬁnition of µ, ρ∗
a =1 ,
so y∗
a ≤ 0, a contradiction. Consequently, y∗




a∈ ˇ A qay∗
a =0 .
If, for some (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S,z ∗
l,s < 0, then, by the deﬁnition of µ, r∗
l,s =0 ,
so z∗
l,s ≥ 0, a contradiction. If, for some (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S,z ∗
l,s > 0, then, by the
deﬁnition of µ, r∗
l,s =1 , so z∗
l,s ≤ 0, a contradiction. Consequently, z∗
l,s =0 , for
all (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S. Moreover, for every s ∈S ,z ∗
L+1,s = −
 
(l,s)∈ ˇ L×S pl,sz∗
l,s +
Rs·y∗ =0 .
It follows that 0 ∈   z(r∗,ρ ∗), so a ﬁx-price equilibrium at prices (p,q) exists.
Appendix 2: local comparative statics
In the optimization problem an individual faces when determining his demand,
the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the rationing constraints in the mar-
kets for commodities (assets) are π (ρ). The individual optimization problem
leads to the study of a modiﬁed demand function,   di. At prices and Lagrange
multipliers (p,q,π,ρ),   di is deﬁned by the solution to the optimization problem
max ui(x) −
 
(l,s)∈ ˇ L×S πl,sxl,s −
 
a∈ ˇ A ρaya,
s.t. qy ≤ 0,
ps(xs − ei
s) ≤ Rs·y, s ∈S .
10The set of (p,q,π,ρ) on which each individual optimization problem has a solu-
tion is N. Whenever (p∗,q∗) are competitive equilibrium prices, N is a neigh-
borhood of (p∗,q∗,0,0).
The modiﬁed demand function,   di,i∈I , is continuously diﬀerentiable on
N.














l,s = maxi∈I xi∗
l,s − ei
l,s, (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S,
y−
a = mini∈I yi∗
a ,y +
a = maxi∈I yi∗
a ,a ∈ ˇ A,
determine the minimal and the maximal excess demands on both the spot and
the asset markets. If




l,s}, (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S,




l,s}, (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S,
Ia = {i ∈I: yi∗
a = y−
a },a ∈ ˇ A,
Ia = {i ∈I: yi∗
a = y+
a },a ∈ ˇ A,
then, in a neighborhood of the competitive equilibrium, only individuals in Il,s
(Il,s) may be rationed on supply (demand) in the spot market (l,s), and only
individuals in Ia (Ia) on supply (demand) in the asset market a.
For an open set of endowments with full Lebesgue measure Ω ⊂ IR
I(L+1)S
++ ,
for any competitive equilibrium ((p∗,q∗),(x∗,y∗)) of E, |I l,s |=| Il,s |=1 ,
(l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S, and |I a |=| Ia |=1 ,a∈ ˇ A.
For a generic set of economies, there is exactly one individual in each market
with the minimal excess demand and exactly one individual with the maximal
excess demand. For the remainder, the allocation of endowments in the econ-
omy E b e l o n gt ot h es e tΩ , which permits the study of the local structure of
the set ﬁx-price equilibria in the neighborhood of a competitive equilibrium
((p∗,q∗),(x∗,y∗)) of E.








    
    
πl,s, if πl,s ≤ 0a n d{i} = Il,s





    
    
ρa, if ρa ≤ 0a n d{i} = Ia
or ρa ≥ 0a n d{i} = Ia,
0, otherwise.
11The function c associates with Lagrange multipliers, (π,ρ), ﬁx-price equilibria
in the neighborhood of the competitive equilibrium. The aggregate modiﬁed
excess demand function for commodities and assets other than the num´ eraire is




i∈I   di
l,s(p,q,ci(π,ρ)) −
 
i∈I ei, (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S,
  za(p,q,π,ρ)=
 
i∈I   di
a(p,q,ci(π,ρ)),a ∈ ˇ A.
For the study of ﬁx-price equilibria in the neighborhood of the competitive
equilibrium, it is suﬃcient to restrict attention to the zero points of   z. Neigh-
borhoods N i
xi∗,yi∗ are such that, for every (x,y) ∈N x∗,y∗ = ×i∈IN i
xi∗,yi∗, for






















l,s,i  = i ,i   ∈ Il,s
yi
 
a < 0a n dyi
 
a <y i
a,i  = i ,i   ∈I a
yi
 
a > 0a n dyi
 
a >y i
a,i  = i ,i   ∈ Ia.
If ((p∗,q∗),(x∗,y∗)) is a competitive equilibrium, and (x,y) ∈N x∗,y∗, then
(x,y) ∈D (p,q) if and only if there is (p,q,π,ρ) ∈Nsuch that   di(p,q,ci(π,ρ))
=( xi,yi),i∈I , and   z(p,q,π,ρ)=( 0 ,0).
The function   z is Lipschitz continuous because of the diﬀerentiability of the
functions   di and the Lipschitz continuity of the functions ci. It is diﬀerentiable
at each (p,q,π,ρ) ∈Nwhere all components of π and ρ are non-zero. For each
sign vector r without zero components,
N r = {(p,q,π,ρ) ∈N: πl,srl,s > 0,(l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S,ρ ara > 0,a∈ ˇ A}.
The function   z is diﬀerentiable on N r. The limit of its Jacobian, limn→∞ ∂  z
(pn,qn,πn,ρ n)=∂  zr(p∗,q∗,0,0), along a sequence ((pn,qn,πn,ρ n) ∈Nr) that
converges to (p∗,q∗,0, 0), exists;
∂ˇ p,ˇ q  zr
l,s(p∗,q∗,0,0) =
 
i∈I ∂ˇ p,ˇ q   di
l,s(p∗,q∗,0,0) = ∂ˇ p,ˇ qzl,s(p∗,q∗),
∂ˇ p,ˇ q  zr
a(p∗,q∗,0,0) =
 
i∈I ∂ˇ p,ˇ q   di
a(p∗,q∗,0,0) = ∂ˇ p,ˇ qza(p∗,q∗),
where z(p,q) denotes the unconstrained total excess demand function for com-
modities and assets other than the numeraires at prices (p,q). It follows that the
Jacobian with respect to (ˇ p, ˇ q) is independent of r at a competitive equilibrium.
Lemma 1. If ((p∗,q∗),(x∗,y∗)) is a competitive equilibrium, such that ∂z (p∗,
q∗) is of full rank, then, for each sign vector r without zero components, the
12tangent cone at (p∗,q∗) to the set of price systems having a local ﬁx-price equi-
librium with state of the markets r is
{(p,q) ∈P×Q:(ˇ p, ˇ q)=( ∂z(p∗,q∗))−1∂π,ρ  zr(p∗,q∗,0,0)(π,ρ),
πl,srl,s > 0,(l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S,ρ ara > 0,a∈ ˇ A}.
Proof The restriction of   z to N r extends to a diﬀerentiable function   z : N→
IR
LS+A as follows. For i ∈I , the function   ci is deﬁned by   ci
l,s(π,ρ)=πl,s
if i ∈I l,s,r l,s = −1, or i ∈ Il,s,r l,s =+ 1 ,   ci
l,s(π,ρ) = 0 otherwise, and
  ci
a(π,ρ)=ρa if i ∈I a,r a = −1, or i ∈ Ia,r a =+ 1 , and   ci
a(π,ρ) = 0 oth-
erwise. The function   z is deﬁned as   z with c replaced by   c. Since ∂z(p∗,q∗)
is of full rank, it follows by the implicit function theorem that the solution to
  z(p,q,π,ρ)=( 0 ,0) determines p and q as a function of π and ρ in a neighbor-
hood of (0,0). The derivative of this function at (0,0) with respect to π and
ρ is given by (∂z(p∗,q∗))−1∂π,ρ  z(p∗,q∗,0,0). The expression in the proposition
follows immediately if one takes into account that only π’s and ρ’s satisfying
πl,srl,s > 0, (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S, and ρara > 0,a∈ ˇ A, should be considered. 
Proposition 2 in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) shows that the as-
sumption that ∂z(p∗,q∗) has full rank at every competitive equilibrium holds
generically in endowments. Lemma 3.2 characterizes the tangent cones to the
regions in the price space having a ﬁx-price equilibrium with state of the markets
r in the neighborhood of a competitive equilibrium. It guarantees neither that
the closures of these tangent cones cover the price space nor that the tangent
cones are full-dimensional nor that the tangent cones do not intersect. If this
were the case, local uniqueness would result.
In general, an increase in a price causes a diﬀerent individual to be rationed
as a decrease in a price. Since ∂π,ρ  zr, and therefore the tangent cone, depend on
∂π,ρ  di for the individual i that is rationed, the fact that the tangent cones need
not ﬁt nicely together does not come as a surprise. In abstract terms, the fact
that diﬀerent individuals get rationed at diﬀerent prices in the neighborhood
of a competitive equilibrium, creates non-diﬀerentiabilities in the function   z
at competitive prices. At a point of non-diﬀerentiability, the implicit function
theorem need not apply, and local uniqueness may fail.
The generalized Jacobian of a Lipschitz continuous function f at a point x
is the convex hull of all matrices that are the limits of the sequence (∂f(xn)),
where (xn) is a convergent sequence with limn→∞ xn = x and f is diﬀerentiable
at xn.
A restriction of the fundamentals of the economy, the utility functions of
individuals and the matrix of asset payoﬀs is required to guarantee that, gener-
ically, competitive equilibrium allocations are diﬀerentiably locally unique as
ﬁx-price equilibrium allocations
If a function f is Lipschitz continuous, f(  x,   y)=0 , and every matrix M in
∂xf(  x,   y) has full rank, then there exist a neighborhood N  x,  y, a neighborhood
N  y, and a Lipschitz continuous function g on N  y such that (x,y) ∈N   x,  y and
f(x,y) = 0 if and only if y ∈N   y and x = g(y).
13Assumption 2. For endowments in Ω∗, an open set of full Lebesgue measure,
if ((p∗,q∗), (x∗,y∗)) is a competitive equilibrium, then the determinants of the
matrices ∂π,ρ  zr(p∗,q∗,0,0), with r sign vectors without zero components, are
either all equal to −1 or all equal to +1.
By an argument similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 1, Laroque
(1981), the competitive equilibrium allocation is diﬀerentiably locally unique as
a ﬁx-price equilibrium allocation.
Remark An example of an economy that satisﬁes diﬀerentiable local uniqu-
eness for all endowments and, ` a fortiori, satisﬁes Assumption 2.
There are three states of the world, two commodities and two assets. The






s(xs)=αi lnx1,s +( 1− αi)x2,s, 0 <α i < 1,
and a uniform probability measure π over the states of the world. The payoﬀs
of the assets are R·1 =( 1 ,0,0) , and R·2 =( 0 ,1,0) . Endowments are chosen
such that |I l,s |=| Il,s |=1 , (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S, and |I a |=| Ia |=1 ,a∈ ˇ A, so they
belong to a set of full Lebesgue measure by Lemma 4.4.
Competitive equilibrium prices are (p∗,q∗). All partial derivatives are eval-
uated at (p∗,q∗,0,0). It holds that ∂π1,s  zr = ∂π1,s   di(1,s), where {i(1,s)} = I1,s
if r1,s = −1, and {i(1,s)} = I1,s if r1,s =+ 1 . An increase in π1,s corresponds
to the introduction of demand rationing or the disappearance of supply ra-
tioning on commodity (1,s), which decreases the demand for commodity (1,s),
so ∂π1,s  zr
1,s is negative. The change in income spent on commodity (1,s) equals
p∗
1,s∂π1,s  zr
1,s. The individual i(1) is the one aﬀected by rationing in the asset
market, so {i(1)} = I1 if r1 = −1, and {i(1)} = I1 if r1 =+ 1 . From the
properties of the Cobb-Douglas utility function, it follows that
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∂π1,3   d
i(1,3)
1,1 =0 ,∂ π1,3   d
i(1,3)
1,2 =0 ,∂ π1,3   d
i(1,3)
1 =0 ,





















2 ,∂ ρ1   d
i(1)
1,3 =0 .
The sign of the determinant of ∂π,ρ  zr does not change by premultiplying it by





1) and postmultiplying it by











1,2,1/ −   zr
1,3,1/ − q∗
1∂ρ1  zr
1) . The resulting matrix is given by
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1 )(1 − α
i(1)
1 ) > 0.
The determinant of ∂π,ρ  zr is positive, irrespective of the sign vector r. It follows
that the competitive equilibrium allocation is diﬀerentiably locally unique as a
ﬁx-price equilibrium allocation. 
As in Laroque (1981), whenever there are two sign vectors without zero





(p∗,q∗,0,0) have opposite signs and ∂z(p∗,q∗) has full rank, then for ev-
ery neighborhood Nx∗,y∗ there exists for every neighborhood Np∗,q∗ a price sys-
tem (p,q) ∈N p∗,q∗ with at least two ﬁx-price equilibrium allocations in Nx∗,y∗.
Assumption 2 is “almost necessary” for the diﬀerentiable local uniqueness of
competitive equilibrium allocations.
Local uniqueness of ﬁx-price equilibrium allocations at competitive equilibria
is not too strong a requirement. It is less demanding than the requirement
of uniqueness of ﬁx-price equilibrium allocations at prices in a neighborhood
of competitive prices. The latter requirement guarantees a certain degree of
generality of our results.
The function (  x,   y):Np∗,q∗ → IR
I(L+1)S+I(A+1) associates the unique ﬁx-
price equilibrium allocation in Nx∗,y∗ to (p,q) ∈N p∗,q∗. The indirect utility
function of an individual at a locally unique ﬁx-price equilibrium is deﬁned by
vi(p,q)=ui(  xi(p,q)), (p,q) ∈N p∗,q∗.
Lemma 2. If ((p∗,q∗),(x∗,y∗)) is a competitive equilibrium, then the indirect
utility function vi : Np∗,q∗ → IR is diﬀerentiable and
∂pl,svi(p∗,q∗)=−∂xL+1,sui(xi∗)(xi∗
l,s − ei
l,s), (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S.
Proof For every sign vector r, the restriction of vi to Np∗,q∗ ∩PQ (r), denoted
vi
r
, is diﬀerentiable. From the diﬀerentiation of the budget constraints
q  yi
r
(p,q)=0a n dps(  xi
r




15with respect to pl,s, and the ﬁrst order conditions for individual optimization
















Since the derivative is independent of the sign vector r, the result follows. 
Appendix 3: Pareto improving price regulation
Price regulation can Pareto improve on a competitive equilibrium ((p∗,q∗),
(x∗,y∗)) if there exist prices of commodities p such that a ﬁx-price equilibrium
of commodities at prices of commodities and assets (p,q∗) Pareto dominates the
allocation x∗. The ambiguity introduced by the possibility of multiple ﬁx-price
equilibrium allocations at prices (p,q∗) is circumvented by considering local
variations at competitive equilibrium allocations that are diﬀerentiably locally
unique as ﬁx-price equilibria.
Pareto improvement by price regulation is possible only if the asset market
is incomplete. Another necessary requirement is that the economy allows for
heterogeneous individuals.
Assumption 3. A +1<Sand I>1.
The function ϕ is deﬁned by
ϕ(x,  λ,   p,e)=

    
  

∂ui(xi) −   λi  p, i ∈I
 






l,s), (l,s) ∈L×S\{ (L +1 ,S)}
 








where the Lagrangian multiplier   λi ∈ I R does not vary with the state of the
world, the prices of commodities   p ∈ IR
(L+1)S−1
++ ×{1} are discounted prices, with
only the price of commodity (L+1,S) normalized to 1, and n  = 0 is a ﬁxed vector
such that nR =0 . In the standard reformulation of the incomplete markets
model in discounted prices, it is assumed that one individual is unconstrained,
so that his marginal utility at an optimal choice is proportional to the price
system. Pareto optimality implies that the marginal utility vectors of all agents
16should be proportional to the price system. The function ϕ is completed by
specifying budget constraints and market clearing conditions, and one condition
for every individual but one that recognizes the incompleteness of markets:  
s∈S ns  ps(xi
s − ei
s)=0 . The existence of n  = 0 such that nR = 0 follows
from market incompleteness. It follows that the function ϕ vanishes at a Pareto
optimal competitive equilibrium.
For a function f that depends on a vector of variables α and on endowments
e, fe(α) is the function that results from ﬁxing e; for instance, ϕe(x,  λ,   p)=
ϕ(x,  λ,   p,e).
Lemma 3. Generically, competitive equilibrium allocations are not Pareto op-
timal.
Proof A necessary condition for x to be a Pareto optimal competitive equi-
librium allocation for an economy e is that ϕe(x,  λ,   p)=0 . Since the dimension
of the domain of ϕe is lower than the dimension of the range, whenever ϕe is
transverse to 0, a solution to ϕe(x,  λ,   p) = 0 does not exist. By a standard
argument, ϕ is transverse to 0. By the transversal density theorem, the set
of economies for which ϕe is transverse to 0 has full Lebesgue measure. By a
standard argument, this set can be chosen to be open. 
The function ψ :Ξ× Ω∗ → IR
N is deﬁned by
ψ(ξ,e)=

    
    







s) − Rs·yi,i ∈I ,s∈S




l,s), (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S
 
i∈I yi
a,a ∈ ˇ A
qyi,i ∈I

    
    
     

,






I × ˇ P × ˇ Q. The
dimension of Ξ is N. When ξ∗ is consistent with a competitive equilibrium, it
is necessarily the case that ψe(ξ∗)=0 .
The function h :Ξ× IR
I × Ω∗ → IR













A competitive equilibrium can be Pareto improved by price regulation if the
matrix of partial derivatives of the indirect utility functions with respect to
17prices has full rank4. By Proposition 4.8, this matrix is guaranteed to have full
rank if there is no solution to ψe(ξ) = 0 in combination with he(ξ,α)=0 .
The function   ψ :Ξ× IR
I × Ω∗ → IR







If   ψ is transverse to 0, then it follows from the transversal density theorem that
for a subset of endowments of full Lebesgue measure,   ψe is transverse to 0. If
LS ≥ I, then the dimension of the range of   ψe exceeds that of the domain.
Transversality of   ψe implies that there are no solutions to the associated system
of equations. It is possible to Pareto improve all competitive equilibria by price
regulation.
Proposition 1. If LS ≥ I, then, generically, all competitive equilibria of E can
be Pareto improved by price regulation.
Proof One ﬁxes (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S and Ω∗∗, an open subset of endowments in Ω∗ of
full Lebesgue measure, such that no competitive equilibrium of the associated
economy E is Pareto optimal. The function   ψ :Ξ× Ω∗∗ → IR





















If   ψ(ξ,e)=0 , then the matrix   M of partial derivatives of   ψ evaluated at (ξ,e)
has full row rank: if v   M =0 , then v =0 . The components of v are v1,i,l,s,i∈I ,
(l,s) ∈L×S ,v 2,i,s,i∈I ,s∈S ,v 3,i,a,i∈I ,a∈A ,v 4,l,s, (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S,v 5,a,
a ∈ ˇ A,v 6,i,i∈I , and v9, according to the labelling of the equations deﬁning
  ψ.
If v is such that v   M =0 , then 0 = v ∂ei
L+1,s
  ψ(ξ,e)=−v2,i,s,i∈I ,s∈S .
It follows that, for i ∈I ,
0=v ∂ei
l,s
  ψ(ξ,e)=−v4,l,s, (l,s) ∈ ( ˇ L\{ l}) ×S,
0=v ∂ei
l,s










Consequently, if v4,l,  s = 0 for some   s ∈S\{ s}, then v9 =0a n dv4,l,s =0 , for














,i , i   ∈I ,s ∈S\{ s}.
4If the matrix of partial derivatives has full rank, it is possible to generate any desired
marginal change in utilities by means of price regulation.



















s2. The economy e has then a Pareto optimal competitive equilib-
rium induced by ξ, contradicting e ∈ Ω∗∗. Consequently, v4,l,s =0 ,s∈S\{ s},
and v9 =0 .
For i ∈I , and (l,s) ∈L×S ,
0=v ∂xi
l,s
  ψ(ξ,e)=v 
1,i,·,·∂xi
l,s∂ui(xi).
It is possible to represent a utility function satisfying A2 by one with ∂2ui(xi)
negative deﬁnite on a bounded subset of the consumption set. Then it follows
that v1,i,·,· =0 . For i ∈I , 0=v ∂yi
A+1
  ψ(ξ,e)=v8,i. Also, for a ∈ ˇ A, 0=
v ∂yi
a
  ψ(ξ,e)=v5,a. Finally, 0 = v ∂λi
s
  ψ(ξ,e)=v 
3,i,·R 
s·,i∈I ,s∈S . Since R
has full column rank it follows that v3,i,a =0 ,i∈I ,a∈A .
Therefore, v =0 ,   M has full row rank N +1 , and   ψ is transverse to 0.
The set of endowments such that   ψe is transverse to zero is denoted   Ωl,s. By
the transversal density proposition, Ω∗∗ \   Ωl,s has Lebesgue measure zero. For
e ∈   Ωl,s, the dimension of the range of   ψe exceeds that of the domain, so
(  ψe)−1({0})=∅.
The set   Ω=∩(l,s)∈ ˇ L×S  Ωl,s is of full Lebesgue measure and, by a standard
argument, open. Redeﬁne the function   ψ such that endowments belong to
Ω∗∩  Ω. For (ξ,α,e) such that   ψ(ξ,α,e)=0 ,   M is the matrix of partial derivatives
of   ψ evaluated at (ξ,α,e).
If v is such that v   M =0 , and the components of v are denoted by v1,i,l,s,
v2,i,s,v 3,i,a,v 4,l,s,v 5,a,v 6,i,v 7,l,s, and v8, then, 0 = v ∂ei
L+1,s
  ψ(ξ,α,e)=−v2,i,s,
i ∈I ,s∈S . Hence,
0=v ∂ei
l,s
  ψ(ξ,α,e)=−v4,l,s − αiλi
sv7,l,s,i ∈I , (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S.
Since
 
i∈I(αi)2 =1 , there is i  such that αi
 
 =0 . If there is s ∈Ssuch that,
























































l,s)=0 , a contradiction since e ∈





s  =0 .





s)v7,l,s =0 , so v7,l,s =0 , and, thus v4,l,s =0 .
Also, 0 = v ∂αi    ψ(ξ,α,e)=2 αi
 
v8, so, since αi
 
 =0 ,v 8 =0 . It follows as in the
ﬁrst part of the proof that v1,i,l,s =0 ,i∈I , (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S, that v6,i =0 ,i∈I ,
that v5,a =0 ,a∈ ˇ A, and that v3,i,a =0 ,i∈I ,a∈A .
Therefore,   M has rank N + LS +1a n d   ψ intersects 0 transversally. If
  Ω is the set of economies such that   ψe is transverse to 0, then Ω∗ \   Ωh a s
19Lebesgue measure zero by the transversal density theorem. Openness follows
by a standard argument. 
Generically, it is possible to make every individual better oﬀ by choosing
appropriate price regulations on the spot markets when asset markets are in-
complete. One needs at least as many instruments, LS, as individuals, I.Propo-
sition 1 makes clear that this is all one needs. This is not the case in the con-
strained suboptimality result of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986), which
applies when 2L ≤ I ≤ L(S − 1) + 1.
A competitive equilibrium can be Pareto improved by uniform price regu-
lation if the matrix of partial derivatives of the indirect utility functions with
respect to uniform price regulation has full rank.
The function k :Ξ× IR
I × Ω∗ → IR










The matrix of partial derivatives of the indirect utility functions with respect to
uniform price regulation is guaranteed to have full rank if there is no solution
to ψe(ξ) = 0 in combination with ke(ξ,α)=0 .
Corollary 1. If L ≥ I, then, generically, all competitive equilibria of E can be
Pareto improved by uniform price regulation.
Proof The argument follows that in the proof of Proposition 5.3. The equa-
tions related to h that characterize Pareto improving price regulation are re-
placed by the equations related to k that characterize Pareto improvements
by uniform price regulation. This deﬁnes a function ψ. The matrix M gives
the partial derivatives of ψ evaluated at some (ξ,α,e) with ψ(ξ,α,e)=0 . If
v M =0 , by considering the partial derivatives with respect to ei
l,s, it follows
that v2,i,s =0 ,i∈I ,s∈S , and v4,l,s + αiλi
sv7,l =0 ,i∈I , (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S. If i 
is such that αi
 






















































l,s),l ∈ ˇ L,
which contradicts e ∈   Ω. It follows that v4,l,s =0 , (l,s) ∈ ˇ L×S, and v7,l =0 ,l∈
ˇ L. The remainder of the proof follows the argument in the proof of Proposition
6. 
20